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Abstract As the cloud computing paradigm evolves, new
types of cloud-based services have become available, includ-
ing security services. Some of the most important and most
commonly adopted security services are firewall services.
These cannot be easily deployed in a cloud, however, because
of a lack of mechanisms preserving firewall policy confi-
dentiality. Even if they were provided, the customer traffic
flowing through the Cloud Service Provider infrastructure
would still be exposed to eavesdropping and information
gaining by performing analysis. To bypass these issues, the
following article introduces a novel framework, known as
the Ladon Hybrid Cloud, for preserving cloud-based fire-
wall policy confidentiality. It is shown that in this framework,
a high level of privacy is provided thanks to leveraging an
anonymized firewall approach and a hybrid cloud model. A
number of optimization techniques, which help to further
improve theLadonHybridCloud privacy level, are also intro-
duced. Finally, analysis performed on the framework shows
that it is possible to find a trade-off between theLadonHybrid
Cloudprivacy level, its congestionprobability, and efficiency.
This argument has been demonstrated through the results of
conducted experiments.
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1 Introduction
During the past couple of years, the cloud computing para-
digm has evolved from an experimental approach to hosting
Information andCommunications Technology (ICT) services
in a distributed systems environment, to a leading trend in the
ICT market [1]. Thanks to this, most types of services are
available in a cloud today, including security services. The
model of hosting security services in a cloud is referred to as
Security as a Service (SecaaS) [2].
Following the needs of business which keep increasing
due to the expansion of the technology, many ICT compa-
nies, including leaders such asAT&Twith itsNetwork-Based
FireWall Services (NBFWS) [3], have already begun offering
security services in a cloud. These include firewall services,
Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) services, e-mail filtering,
and web filtering. In most cases, including AT&T NBFWS
and Cloudera Enterprise Services Cloud (ESC) [4], the secu-
rity services are deployed by leveraging a hybrid cloudmodel
with customers connected to the Cloud Service Provider
(CSP) via a secure Virtual Private Network (VPN) connec-
tion. In such a system, most of the customer security services
are hosted in a cloud, while the basic security infrastructure,
responding to last mile attacks for example, remains on its
premises. The on-premises infrastructure can be managed by
the CSP or the customer. Alternatively, a hybridmanagement
system can be applied with the CSP being responsible for the
on-premises infrastructure installation, its initial configura-
tion, monitoring, etc., and the customer being responsible for
the entire security policy management.
One of the core security services adopted by the vast
majority of organizations are firewall services. It is hard to
imagine an enterprise, government unit, university, or even
home business running its network services without being
protected by a firewall. Thanks to such technologies asAT&T
123
236 T. Kurek et al.
NBFWS or Virtela ESC, these can be outsourced to the
cloud, resulting in significantly reduced management over-
head, decreased Total Cost of Ownership (TCO), improved
business agility, and so on [5]. However, because of a lack
of mechanisms preventing the CSP from having an insight
into the customer’ firewall policy, there are still issues of
information confidentiality and privacy [6–9].
In addition, another threat is information gaining by traffic
eavesdropping and analysis. Since in a hybrid cloud SecaaS
model all the traffic flows unencrypted through the CSP
infrastructure and there are nomechanismsprotecting against
eavesdropping, sensitive information such as that regarding
allowed Internet Protocol (IP) addresses can be easily gained
by the CSP based on traffic analysis. This exposes a serious
vulnerability of such systems, as according to recent reports,
most data harvesting events take place during transit [10,11].
In addition, although the CSP itself is obliged by contract to
maintain information confidentiality, according to research
shown in [12,13], employees would not hesitate to steal such
sensitive information if laid off, for example.
This leads to the following conclusion. Until mechanisms
preserving firewall policy confidentiality and preventing
information gaining by traffic eavesdropping and analysis are
designed, organizations will not be able to run their firewall
services in a cloud in a way that is sufficiently confidential
to preserve their privacy. This problem seems to be an unre-
solved security hole, as only one solution has been proposed
so far.
Referred to as the Ladon framework by its authors, it
attempts to preserve cloud-based firewall policy confiden-
tiality [14]. It is supposed to achieve it by leveraging an
anonymized firewall in the public cloud. In such frameworks,
the CSP is prevented from having an insight into the original
firewall policy. However, the Ladon framework provides no
mechanism for preventing the CSP from deducing the origi-
nal firewall policy by traffic eavesdropping and analysis. As
the final decision on network packets is still known to the
CSP, it can determine the original firewall policy over time.
As such, the privacy of cloud-based firewall policies cannot
be preserved using Ladon.
Motivated by the above observations, the following con-
tributions are made in this paper. Firstly, a novel framework
for preserving cloud-based firewall policy confidentiality,
known as the Ladon Hybrid Cloud, is introduced as an exten-
sion and augmentation to the regular Ladon framework. It
is shown that by introducing the purposefulness of packet
decision uncertainty, the main drawback of Ladon—the risk
of firewall deanonymization by packets eavesdropping and
analysis—is significantly reduced. Additional optimization
techniques which help improve Ladon Hybrid Cloud pri-
vacy level based on the type of firewall policy in use are
also introduced. It is shown that after deploying the Ladon
Hybrid Cloud according to best practices, the risk of infor-
mation gaining by the CSP does not differ significantly from
that of a regular Internet Service Provider (ISP). Finally, by
performing mathematical framework analysis, the results of
which have been confirmed through the results of the exper-
iment performed, the article shows that it is possible to find
a trade-off between the Ladon Hybrid Cloud privacy level,
its congestion probability, and efficiency.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. First of all,
related work is reviewed in Sect. 2. Section 3 includes a
presentation of the Ladon framework. In Sect. 4, a novel
framework for preserving cloud-based firewall policy confi-
dentiality, known as the Ladon Hybrid Cloud, is introduced,
along with its optimization techniques. In Sect. 5, all the
mathematical framework analyses are shown. Their experi-
mental results follow in Sect. 6. All observed Ladon Hybrid
Cloud limitations and directions for future work are noted in
Sect. 7. Finally, Sect. 8 contains the conclusions.
2 Related work
Khakpour and Liu [14] presented the Ladon framework as a
first step toward cloud-based firewalling. The Ladon lever-
ages an anonymized firewall based on a set of Bloom Filter
Firewall Decision Diagrams (BFFDDs) which are compiled
from regular Firewall Decision Diagrams (FDDs) [15] in
which edge sets are replaced by Bloom Filters (BFs) [16].
Thanks to the merging of these elements that are explained in
detail in the next section, regular Access Control List (ACL)
rules are transformed into a structure which is still visible to
the CSP, although it does not provide it with straightforward
information regarding the original ACL structure. In such a
framework, the ACL rules of the customer’s firewall can nei-
ther be directly read by the CSP, nor easily cracked using
brute-force techniques. However, as described below, these
can be determined by packets eavesdropping and analysis.
Other studies related to the topic of this article are those
related to moving target defense. In [17], the authors have
studied techniques of substituting different targets for any
given request in order to create a dynamic and uncertain
attack surface area of a given system. This enabled them to
demonstrate that such systems are less vulnerable and more
secure. The Ladon Hybrid Cloud framework presented in
this article also intentionally introduces uncertainty to the
attack surface area; however, it achieves this by using a BF
false-positive rate, as explained below. All targets remain
unchanged for all given requests over time.
3 From ACL to Ladon
An FDD, presented by Gouda and Liu in [16], is a mathe-
matical structure which is a formal firewall representation. In
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Fig. 1 FDD construction
fact, the FDD transforms a regular firewall policy based on a
set of Access Control Entry (ACEs) into a tree where packets
pass from top to bottom, with particular packet fields being
examined at each level. Depending on its particular packet
field value, the packet is directed to one of the edges, forming
a decision path which finally takes one of the two possible
decisions: permit or deny.
This concept is shown in Fig. 1. Suppose that the firewall
takes its final decision based on the source and destination
IP addresses alone. The FDD then consists of two levels: one
representing the source IP address and the other represent-
ing the destination IP address. The edge sets are calculated
based on the corresponding ACL. For example, for a packet
sourced at 10.10.10.10 and destined for 192.168.192.168,
which fits the first ACE in the ACL, its source IP address is
examined first on the F1 node. 10.10.10.10 fits the 0.0.0.0/1
set, so the packet is passed to the e11 edge, where its des-
tination IP address is examined on the F21 node. Because
192.168.192.168 fits the 128.0.0.0/1 set, the packet is passed
to the e22 edge, resulting in a deny decision.
Unlike in a regular firewall, where a packet is examined as
a whole by testing it against ACEs from top to bottom until
the first match is found, the FDD takes a completely different
approach. It splits the packet into fields and examines each
field independently on particular tree levels. The resulting
path leads to a single, ultimate decision. Sample FDD imple-
mentation known as ‘Policy Trie’ was also presented inde-
pendently ofGouda andLiu’swork by Fulp andTarsa in [18].
ABF, presented by Bloom in [16], is amathematical prob-
abilistic data structure which is used to test whether an object
is a member of a set in a time-efficient manner. Mathemati-
cally, a BF is a bit array with a size of m which is generated
by calculating k-independent hash functions for each of n
elements of the set. For each of the results, the correspond-
ing index in BF is set to 1. To check whether an element is
a member of the original set, the same hash functions are
calculated and corresponding indexes of the BF are checked.
If at least one of them is 0, the element is not a member of the
original set. If all of them are 1, the element may be a mem-
ber of the original set. The above indicates that a BF may
Fig. 2 BF construction and usage
result in false positives. Moreover, the value of false-positive
probability, also known as the BF false-positive rate, can be
calculated based on the k, m, and n parameter [19].
This is shown in Fig. 2. Suppose that a BF with a size of
m = 4 using k = 2 hash functions (h1, h2) represents a set
containing n = 2 elements (s1, s2). The BF is generated (case
1) by calculating hash functions for each of the elements
(h1(s1), h2(s1), h1(s2), h2(s2)) and setting up correspond-
ing indexes in the BF (b0, b1, b2 or b3) to 1. Suppose that the
hash function results are as follows: h1(s1) = 0, h2(s1) =
3, h1(s2) = 3, h2(s2) = 2. The following BF indexes are
set to 1 as a result: b0, b2, b3. At this point, the BF can be
used to test object presence in the source set (case 2). For a
given object (sx ) to be tested, the same hash functions are cal-
culated (h1(sx ), h2(sx )) and corresponding BF indexes are
examined to see whether they are set to 1. Suppose that the
hash function results are as follows: h1(sx ) = 0, h2(sx ) = 1.
It is then clear that the object is not an element of the source
set—b1 is not set to 1. On the other hand, if the hash function
results for some other object (sy) to be tested are as follows:
h1(sy) = 0, h2(sy) = 2, the object is considered to be a
member of the source set with some permissible misclassifi-
cation probability, known as the BF false-positive rate.While
the object sy is considered to be a member of the source set,
it actually is not.
So far, brick level structures which build up BFFDD have
been covered. Based on them, the BFFDD definition can be
explained as follows. According to [14], the BFFDD is a data
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Fig. 3 BFFDD construction
Fig. 4 Ladon framework
structure formed from regular FDD where, for a given edge,
the edge set is represented by a BF. Because it is in the nature
of theBF that it may result in false positives, ambiguitiesmay
occur in BFFDD, leading to multiple decision paths and as
a result to multiple decisions. To eliminate such ambigui-
ties N, independent BFFDDs are implemented and executed
simultaneously. The resulting decision paths are then com-
pared looking for a single, common path which leads to a
common, final decision.
The concept of BFFDD and its construction algorithm
is shown in Fig. 3. Suppose that the firewall takes its final
decision based on the source IP address only. The original
ACL is then transformed into an FDD with one level only.
Next, the edge sets e1(0.0.0.0/1) and e2(128.0.0.0/1) are
transformed into BF1 and BF2 correspondingly. The process
ofBF2 construction is shownwithin the gray round rectangle.
However, the BF shown in this example has a size of m = 4
and uses k = 2 hash functions; these are obviously much
greater in a real scenario.
Section 1 shows a standard businessmodel for hostingfire-
wall services in the cloud. Outsourced firewall services are
hosted in the public cloud located in the data center owned
and managed by the CSP. All traffic destined to the cus-
tomer first enters the public cloud, which is connected with
customer premises via a secure VPN connection. The tech-
nology used to deliver firewall services is not visible to the
customer. Assume that it is based on a set of independent
BFFDDs as described above. A framework of cloud-based
firewall services based on BFFDDs is shown in Fig. 4.
Packets permitted on customer premises, referred to as
‘good packets’ in the rest of the article, are represented
there by plain envelopes. In turn, packets denied on customer
premises, referred to as ‘bad packets’ in the rest of the article,
are represented there by striped envelopes. All packets enter
the public cloud first (step 1) where bad packets are discarded
(step 2). Next, good packets are sent to customer LAN (step
3). Such framework was referred to as the Ladon framework
by its authors in [14].
By implementing and testing Ladon in a live environment,
Khakpour and Liu demonstrated that it is an effective frame-
work for the outsourcing of the firewall services. It was also
shown that any attempts to deanonymize the BFFDD can be
extremely time-consuming.
4 Framework design
Assume there is Ladon framework implementedwith the fire-
wall services hosted by an honest-but-curious CSP wishing
to get an insight into the customer’s firewall security pol-
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Fig. 5 Ladon hybrid cloud
icy. The CSP has an insight into the BFFDDs delivering the
firewall services, but as these are just binary structures rep-
resenting the BFs on the edges of the original FDDs used
to generate the BFFDDs, it gives it no information on the
original firewall security policy. However, the CSP has an
insight into whether a packet flowing via the Ladon frame-
work is permitted on the customer side. This is because only
packets permitted on the customer side are flowing via the
VPN connection between the CSP and the customer. Packets
denied on the customer side are discarded in the public cloud.
Although the VPN connection is encrypted, the CSP, as one
of its initiators, can intercept packets entering the VPN.
Therefore, although the regularLadon framework resolves
the issue of firewall policy confidentiality in such a way that
it cannot be directly read, the final decision for a packet is
still known by the CSP. This means that after an appropri-
ately long period of time, the CSP can build up an almost
full knowledge base regarding packets which are permitted
on the customer side. While the underlying ACL structure is
protected, traffic flowing between the CSP and the customer
can still be easily eavesdropped and analyzed to obtain infor-
mation about good packets.
Such a framework allows theCSP to bypass the reconnais-
sance phase, and most of the scanning phase of an attack,
which according to [20], can significantly reduce the time
required to perform the attack. To address this issue, a novel
framework, called theLadonHybridCloud,which introduces
the purposefulness of packet decision uncertainty based on
BFFDD and a hybrid cloud model, was designed and is pre-
sented in the following section of the article.
4.1 Introducing the Ladon hybrid cloud
In a regular Ladon framework, based on a set of BFFDDs,
the final decision for a packet is always certain. However, in
a single BFFDD, ambiguities may occur as a result of BF
false positives. This is because a BF false positive leads to
a situation where the packet field matches both edges on a
particular BFFDD level, resulting in multiple decision paths,
and as a result in multiple decisions for the packet.
Instead of eliminating such ambiguities by using a set of
BFFDDs and searching for a single, common path with a
single, common decision, the Ladon Hybrid Cloud takes a
completely different approach. It leverages a single BFFDD
instead and intentionally allows some of the packets to result
inmultiple decisions. This approach leverages a hybrid cloud
model, as it is a leading trend in the SecaaSmarket [3,4], with
BFFDD in a public cloud and a regular firewall in a private
cloud. In order to simplify the management of the private
cloud, hybrid management can be applied.
In this novel framework, after passing through BFFDD in
a public cloud on the CSP side, packets resulting in certain
deny decisions are directly discarded,while those resulting in
certain permit decisions are sent directly to the customer over
a trusted network. Additionally, packets resulting in multiple
decisions are sent to the private cloud on customer premises
over an untrusted network for additional filtering. Segrega-
tion of packets resulting in certain permit decisions from
those resulting in multiple decisions can be organized based
on the Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) logic.
The LadonHybrid Cloud concept is shown in Fig. 5 inside
the gray round rectangle. Good packets are represented there
by plain envelopes, while bad packets are represented by
striped envelopes.All packets enter the public cloudfirst (step
1) where those resulting in certain deny decisions are directly
discarded (step 2). Those resulting in certain permit deci-
sions are sent directly to the customer Local Area Network
(LAN) over a trusted VLAN, represented by a continuous
line (steps 3 and 7). Finally, packets resulting in multiple
decisions are sent to the private cloud for additional filter-
ing over an untrusted VLAN, represented by the dotted line
(step 4). The private cloud performs additional filtering by
discarding of the rest of the denied packets (step 5) and sends
permitted packets into the customer LAN (step 6).
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Fig. 6 BFFDDCF construction
Although customer traffic is still exposed to eavesdrop-
ping and analysis by the CSP in the Ladon Hybrid Cloud,
the amount of information carried by particular packets is
reduced compared to a regular Ladon framework. This is
because some packets result in multiple decisions after pass-
ing through BFFDD which causes the knowledge base built
by the hostile CSP not to be 100% accurate. Moreover,
assuming that over time the number of bad packets with dif-
ferent packet headers is growing, packets diversity causes the
knowledge base to grow too. The above assumption takes
into account Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks,
for example, during which most of the source IP addresses
are new [21].
An inaccurate and constantly growing knowledge base
regarding packets perceived by the CSP as good packets
causes the CSP not to fully trust it and forces it to per-
form additional reconnaissance and scanning in order to
obtain accurate information. Moreover, over time, demand
for resources required to store and analyze the data can sig-
nificantly increase. It is therefore clear that the Ladon Hybrid
Cloud eliminates the main drawback of a regular Ladon
framework: the risk of firewall deanonymization by packets
eavesdropping and analysis. This is achieved by introduc-
ing the purposefulness of packet decision uncertainty. The
following sections cover additional framework optimization
mechanisms which help increase this uncertainty even fur-
ther and as a result provide a high level of privacy.
4.2 Ladon hybrid cloud optimization
Although the BFFDD may result in multiple decisions for
some of the packets, for the others, a final decision remains
certain. Part of the knowledge base maintained by the hostile
CSP will therefore always be accurate. It is possible to elim-
inate this vulnerability, however, by redesigning the BFFDD
in such a way that it always results in multiple decisions for
either good or bad packets, based on the adopted firewall
policy type.
In the real world, two types of firewall policies can be
adopted based on organization requirements:
– Closed: Permitting only a specific subset of traffic and
denying the rest,
– Open: Denying only a specific subset of traffic and per-
mitting the rest.
For inbound traffic flow, considered in this article, most orga-
nizations apply the closed firewall policy rather than the open
one, because it minimizes the risk ofmalicious traffic passing
through. In such a case, the BFFDD is redesigned in such a
way that it always results inmultiple decisions for good pack-
ets. As closed firewall policy is a leading trend in most of the
organizations today, it will be used as an example in further
arguments in this article. Likewise, in an organization apply-
ing open firewall policy, the BFFDD can be redesigned so it
always results in multiple decisions for bad packets accord-
ingly.
As has been mentioned, in the case of a closed firewall
policy type, the BFFDD is updated to always result in mul-
tiple decisions for good packets. The only packets that may
still result in certain decisions are therefore bad packets. The
framework is designed in this way, because when adopting
closed firewall policy type, good packets carry significantly
more information for the CSP regarding the original ACL
structure compared to bad packets. This is because a char-
acteristic of closed firewall policy type is that the subset of
traffic which is permitted is much smaller than the subset of
traffic which is denied.
Figure 6 represents a BFFDD with one level and all the
cases that it can result in:
– Case 1: Certain permit decision for good packets,
– Case 2: Multiple decisions for good packets,
– Case 3: Certain deny decision for bad packets,
– Case 4: Multiple decisions for bad packets.
As mentioned above, case 1 should be fully eliminated. To
achieve this, a regular BFFDD is compiled first and then
tested against all good packets. For those resulting in certain
permit decisions (case 1), the BF representing the set of the
edge that leads to a deny decision (BF2 in this case) is updated
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Fig. 7 Ladon hybrid cloud for closed firewalls
so that it results in a forced false positive. As a consequence,
multiple decision paths are applied to all good packets (case
2) leading to multiple decisions applied to all of them. In
other words, the redesigned BFFDD eliminates case 1 by
transforming it into case 2, resulting in three possible cases
(2, 3, and 4) shown inside the gray round rectangle.
The above transformation can be performed on any
BFFDD level; however, for analysis and implementation
simplicity, it is assumed that it is performed on the last
level representing the last examined packet field. Such a
redesigned BFFDD will be referred to as BFFDDCF (Bloom
Filter Firewall Decision Diagram for Closed Firewalls).
Likewise, such a redesigned Ladon Hybrid Cloud which
leverages a BFFDDCF in a public cloud will be referred to
as Ladon Hybrid Cloud for Closed Firewalls (LHCCF).
As a consequence, the traffic flowing between public and
private clouds consists of all good packets and some bad
packets, while multiple decisions are applied to all of them
by the BFFDDCF. This leads to a situation where all pack-
ets flowing between the CSP and the customer go via an
untrusted VLAN represented by the dotted line, so the traffic
segregation engine can be fully eliminated from the LHCCF,
as shown in Fig. 7. As all good packets require additional fil-
tering in the private cloud, there is no traffic flowing between
public and private clouds over the trusted VLAN represented
by the continuous line. It is clear that in this case, the private
cloud needs to process more packets.
In such a framework, the CSP cannot draw any additional
information from the traffic, except of a fact that part of it is
permitted on customer premises. However, the CSP can still
maintain a certain knowledge base regarding packets which
are explicitly denied in the BFFDDCF, and this gives it a very
limited amount of information, as has been stated before.
At this point, the amount of information which the CSP can
extract by performing traffic eavesdropping and analysis does
not differ greatly from that of the regular ISP which the cus-
tomer is connected to. The original firewall policy cannot be
directly read by the CSP or be assumed by performing traffic
eavesdropping and analysis. While the first of these two fea-
tures is provided by the regular Ladon framework, the second
is provided by the Ladon Hybrid Cloud only.
5 Framework analysis
Because of the uncertainty of packet decision making in the
LHCCF, the rate of traffic flowing between public and private
clouds is increased compared to a regular Ladon framework.
This is because the traffic consists not only of good packets,
but also of some bad packets which result in multiple deci-
sions after passing through the BFFDDFC. The factor of bad
packets which are transmitted is determined by the probabil-
ity that the BFFDDCF results in multiple decisions, referred
to as ‘BFFDDCFmultiple decision probability’ in the rest of
this article. Furthermore, the BFFDDCF multiple decision
probability is a result of the false-positive rates of the partic-
ular BFs that make it up. The following section shows how
the parameters of the particular BFs in the BFFDDCF can
be used to control the rate of bad packets flowing between
public and private parts of the LHCCF. As a result, an overall
rate of traffic flowing between the CSP and the customer can
be controlled as well and a trade-off can be found between
the LHCCF privacy level, its congestion probability, and effi-
ciency.
5.1 Controlling traffic rate
So far, it has been shown that the greater the value of the
BFFDDCF multiple decision probability is, the higher the
privacy level is provided by the LHCCF. This is because
increasing the BFFDDCF multiple decision probability
increases the number of bad packets that result in multiple
decisions and, as a result, decreases the amount of informa-
tion carried by particular packets.
But can the BFFDDCF multiple decision probability be
increased without limits? What is its effect on LHCCF con-
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Fig. 8 Traffic flow in the LHCCF
gestion probability and efficiency? The following analysis
attempts to answer these questions. Let us define:
– p—BFFDDCF multiple decision probability
– r—Rate of traffic at the public cloud entrance (packets/s)
– s—Rate of traffic at the public cloud exit (packets/s)
– g—Rate of traffic consisting of good packets (packets/s)
– u—Good packet ratio
– SMAX—Throughput of the private cloud
– pc—LHCCF congestion probability
– e—LHCCF efficiency
These are shown in Fig. 8.
Based on the above, the rate of traffic at the public cloud
exit is:
s = g + p(r − g) (1)
as it consists of all good packets and those bad packets that
result in multiple decisions after passing through the BFFD-
DCF. It is then possible to control the rate of traffic at the
public cloud exit while knowing the value of the BFFDDCF
multiple decision probability, the rate of traffic at the pub-
lic cloud entrance, and the rate of traffic consisting of good
packets.
By expressing the ratio, referred to as ‘good packet ratio’
in the rest of the article, of the rate of traffic consisting of good





Formula 1 can be transformed to a function of good packet
ratio and is:
s = ur + p(r − ur) (3)
Again, it is then possible to control the rate of traffic at the
public cloud exit knowing the value of the BFFDDCF multi-
ple decision probability, the rate of traffic at the public cloud
entrance, and the good packet ratio.
The rate of traffic at the public cloud exit is also the rate of
traffic at the private cloud entrance. It is therefore important
to control the rate of traffic at the private cloud entrance to
ensure that it never exceeds its throughput. This is because
a higher traffic rate results in private cloud congestion and,
as a result, in congestion of the whole LHCCF. The equation
from Formula 3 can be then replaced with the inequality:
SMAX ≥ ur + p(r − ur) (4)
Therefore, by knowing the values of the rate of traffic at the
public cloud entrance andgoodpacket ratio, it is thenpossible
to adjust the BFFDDCF multiple decision probability value
so that the rate of traffic at the private cloud entrance never
exceeds its throughput.
The values of the rate of traffic at the public cloud entrance
and good packet ratio change over time; however, the BFFD-
DCF multiple decision probability cannot change over time,
because of computational limitations as discussed below.
Therefore, while designing BFFDDCF, some constant val-
ues of the rate of traffic at the public cloud entrance (R) and
the good packet ratio (U) need to be assumed instead.
Those could be taken based on maximum values of par-
ticular variables (rMAX, uMAX) observed over time to ensure
LHCCF congestion probability on the lowest possible level.
However, as shown later in this section, high values of R and
U enforce a lower BFFDDCF multiple decision probability
and then, as a result, a lower LHCCF privacy level. As such,
instead of selectingmaximumvalues, it is better to relax them
somewhat (e.g., by selecting average values). On the other
hand, lower R and U values result in a higher privacy level
while allowing LHCCF congestion during r and u peak peri-
ods. This is because instantaneous r and u values exceeding
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R and U constants result in the rate of traffic at the private
cloud entrance exceeding its throughput.
Another parameter to consider when designing the
LHCCF is a time period for which constant values of R and
U are selected. As traffic statistics tend to be similar over
recurrent time periods, it may be worth running different
BFFDDCFs during these periods (e.g., one BFFDDCF dur-
ing the day and another during the night). Thus, constant
values of R and U should be selected, and the following
analysis should be performed for each recurrent time period
independently when designing the LHCCF.
Assuming that statistics of the rate of traffic at the pub-
lic cloud entrance are known, it is then possible to select a
constant value:
R ≈ rMAX (5)
while ensuring that the instantaneous value of r variable
exceeds R constant with a probability of:
pr = P(r > R) (6)
Likewise, assuming that good packet ratio statistics are also
known, it is then possible to select a constant value:
U ≈ uMAX (7)
while ensuring that the instantaneous value of the u variable
exceeds the U constant with a probability of:
pu = P(u > U ) (8)
Based on approximations made in Formulas 6 and 8, the
LHCCF congestion probability is as follows:
pc = P(r > R ∪ u > U )
= pr + pu − P(r > R ∩ u > U ) (9)
It can also be expressed as follows:
pc = P(s > SMAX) = P((ur + p(r − ur)) ≥ SMAX) (10)
Assuming that both fragmentary probabilities and the prob-
ability of a conjunction in Formula 9 are known based on
the traffic analysis, it is then possible to control the LHCCF
congestion probability.
Moreover, it can be seen that the higher the value of
the BFFDDCF multiple decision probability, the higher the
LHCCF congestion probability. On the other hand, it has
already been shown that the higher the value of the BFFD-
DCF multiple decision probability, the higher the LHCCF
privacy level. Thus, finding a trade-off between the LHCCF
privacy level and its congestion probability is a matter of
selecting such a value of the BFFDDCF multiple decision
probability that satisfies both.
Let us also define the LHCCF efficiency as a ratio of the
rate of the traffic at the public cloud entrance and the rate of




u + p(1 − u) (11)
However, as the R constant value has been assumed instead,
the LHCCF efficiency is constant too and is:
E = 1
U + p(1 −U ) (12)
It is then possible to control the LHCCF efficiency while
knowing the value of the BFFDDCF multiple decision prob-
ability.
Moreover, it can be seen that the higher the value of
the BFFDDCF multiple decision probability, the lower the
LHCCF efficiency. Thus, finding a trade-off between the
LHCCFprivacy level and its efficiency is amatter of selecting
such a value of the BFFDDCF multiple decision probability
that satisfies both. Finally, finding a trade-off between the
LHCCF privacy level, its congestion probability and effi-
ciency is a matter of selecting such a value of the BFFDDCF
multiple decision probability that satisfies all three parame-
ters.
By replacing the r and g variables in Formula 4 by the
R and U constants from Formulas 5 and 7, it is transformed
thus:
SMAX ≥ UR + p(R − UR) (13)
therefore, the BFFDDCF multiple decision probability is:
p ≤ SMAX −UR
R(1 −U ) (14)
It is then possible to control the rate of traffic at the private
cloud entrance by adjusting the BFFDDCFmultiple decision
probability value while knowing private cloud throughput
and base statistical traffic parameters. These include the rate
of traffic at the private cloud entrance and the good packet
ratio, both on an agreed level.
As shown in the next subsection, the BFFDDCF multiple
decision probability can take any value between U and 1.
By taking advantage of this property (p ∈ (U, 1]) and by
substituting edge values into Formula 10, it can be seen that
it applies to the R ∈ [SMAX; sMAXU (2−U ) ) interval only. This
is because for the rate of traffic at the public cloud entrance
being lower than the private cloud throughput, theBFFDDCF
multiple decision probability can take any value from the
(U;1] interval. The generalized Formula 14 is then:
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1 for R ∈ [0; SMAX)
SMAX−UR
R(1−U ) for R ∈ [SMAX; SMAXU (2−U ) )
(15)
A plot of the maximum allowable BFFDDCF multiple deci-
sion probability of theR argument including theU parameter
is shown in Fig. 9.
5.2 BF false-positive rate: the core control engine
So far, it has been shown that the BFFDDCF multiple deci-
sion probability can be used to control the rate of traffic
flowing between the CSP and the customer. The following
section takes a closer look at the BFFDDCF multiple deci-
sion probability itself, which is the result of false-positive
rates of particular BFs which make it up.
Based on studies conducted in [18], a classic FDD con-
sists of five fields which include protocol, source IP, source
port, destination IP, and destination port. Suppose that the
BFFDDCF presented in the following example consists of
the same five fields and has j = 5 levels as shown in Fig. 10.
Let us also define:
– pg—BFFDDCF multiple decision probability for good
packets,
– pb—BFFDDCF multiple decision probability for bad
packets,
– p j—Comprehensivemultiple decision probability on the
j-th BFFDDCF level,
– fi j—False-positive rate of the i-th BF on the j-th BFFD-
DCF level.
These are represented in Fig. 10 as values associated with
particular edges and values associated with particular sum-
mary buckles, respectively.
The BFFDDCF multiple decision probability is a sum of
the BFFDDCF multiple decision probability for good pack-
Fig. 10 BFFDDCF internal structure
ets multiplied by the good packet ratio and the BFFDDCF
multiple decision probability for bad packets multiplied by
the bad packet ratio; it is then:
p = Upg + (1 − U )pb = U + (1 −U )pb (16)
This is because good packets, which make up U * 100% of
the total traffic, always result in multiple decisions.
The BFFDDCF multiple decision probability for bad
packets is a comprehensive multiple decision probability on
at least one of its j levels and is then:
pb = 1 − (1 − p1)(1 − p2)(1 − p3)(1 − p4)(1 − p5) (17)
In other words, it is a probability of an opposite event that
ambiguity occurring on none of j levels. No ambiguities
result in comprehensive multiple decision probabilities on
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each BFFDDCF level equal to 0 and in the BFFDDCF mul-
tiple decision probability equal to 0 as well. On the other
hand, even a single ambiguity on any of j levels leads to mul-
tiple decision paths and to multiple decisions. The above is
an internal FDD characteristic [15].
On each of the five levels, multiple decisions for bad pack-
ets occur when at least one of the BFs on this level results in
a false positive. Furthermore, all BFs on the same level can-
not result in a false positive at the same time—at least one
of them must result in a true positive. Because of this, the
comprehensive multiple decision probability for bad packets
on the j-th level is as follows:






(1 − fi j ) (18)
In other words, it is a probability of an opposite event that
none or all of theBFs on the j-th level result in a false positive.
Formula 18 applies to BFFDDCFs without edges with
a set containing all possible values of a particular packet
field (known as ‘default edges’ [14]). This is because in the
BFFDDCF with default edges on a particular level, ambigu-
ities cannot occur on that level, as the packet field always
matches the default edge while it never matches an opposite
edge. As a result, comprehensive multiple decision probabil-
ity on that level is equal to 0, which can then result in the
BFFDDCF multiple decision probability being equal to 0 as
well. To ensure an absence of default edges in BFFDDCF
when designing the ACL used to compile it, it is important
to avoid general statements, but to be as strict as possible
instead. However, if the above cannot be completed because
of the internal ACL structure (e.g., a decision is taken regard-
less of the destination IP address), some redundant statements
can be added which eliminate default edges while not break-
ing ACL structure. This can be completed by modifying the
ACL to work differently for destination IP addresses which
do not actually belong to the customer.
By putting Formulas 17 and 18 into Formula 16, the


















Now suppose that the presented BFFDDCF consists of J lev-
els instead of five. By performing analysis as shown above,
it is possible to find a generalized version of Formula 19 for



















The above equation cannot be solved by analytical methods.










it is possible to designBFFDDCF so that itsmaximumallow-
ablemultiple decision probability is as close to the value from
Formula 12 as possible by selecting appropriate values of the
BFs that build it up. As n, which represents the edge set size,
is known, these parameters include the number of hash func-
tions (k) and BF size (m).
Consequently, it is possible to designBFFDDCFby select-
ing appropriate values of BF parameters so that the rate of
traffic at the private cloud entrance can be controlled while
knowing the private cloud throughput, base statistical traf-
fic parameters, and the particular edge set sizes. Selecting
appropriate BF parameters makes it possible to find a trade-
off betweenLadonHybridCloud privacy level, its congestion
probability, and efficiency.
5.3 Summary
The BFFDDCF multiple decision probability affects the rate
of traffic at the public cloud exit, both with the rate of traffic
at the public cloud entrance and good packet ratio. The rate
of traffic at the public cloud exit is also the rate of traffic
at the private cloud entrance and is limited by the private
cloud throughput. By replacing the rate of traffic at the pub-
lic cloud entrance and the good packet ratio variables with
some constant values, the rate of traffic at the private cloud
entrance depends on the BFFDDCFmultiple decision proba-
bility only. These constant values are calculated based on the
traffic parameters while ensuring LHCCF congestion proba-
bility and its efficiency at a desired level.
Moreover, the BFFDDCF multiple decision probability
depends on false-positive rates of the particular BFs that
make it up. BFs can then be designed in such a way that their
false-positive rates result in a desired value of the BFFDDCF
multiple decision probability. Finally, as theBF false-positive
rate depends on particular BF parameters, these can be used
as a core engine to control the rate of traffic flowing between
the CSP and the customer. Adjusting these parameters and
then their derivatives makes it possible to find a trade-off
between LHCCF privacy level, its congestion probability,
and efficiency.
6 Experimental results
In order to confirm the validity of the analysis performed
and to demonstrate the veracity of its key findings, the fol-
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lowing experiments were conducted. First, a simulation of
LHCCF was performed based on traffic statistics from two
real firewalls. The experiment demonstrated in practice that
it is possible to find a trade-off between the LHCCF privacy
level, its congestion probability, and efficiency by select-
ing an appropriate value of the BFFDDCF multiple decision
probability. Next, software for generating BFFDDCF and
testing purposes was implemented. It was demonstrated in
practice that it is possible to design BFFDDCF with the
desired value of multiple decision probability by selecting
appropriate parameters of BFs that build it up.
6.1 BFFDDCF multiple decision probability selection
Section 5 shows that the core parameters of the LHCCF
which affect the LHCCF privacy level, its congestion proba-
bility, and efficiency, are the rate of traffic at the public cloud
entrance, good packet ratio, and throughput of the private
cloud. It has been shown that while throughput of the private
cloud is constant, the remainingparameters changeover time.
As such, the analysis has been based on the constant values
of the rate of the traffic at the public cloud entrance and the
good packet ratio and selected for each recurring period of
time. Contrary to the analysis from Sect. 5, the following
simulations demonstrated in practice how the instantaneous
values of the LHCCF congestion probability and efficiency
change over time depending on real-time statistics of the rate
of traffic at the public cloud entrance and the good packet
ratio.
The real-time statistics of the rate of the traffic at the public
cloud entrancewere gathered from two real firewalls, referred
to as ‘Firewall 1’ and ‘Firewall 2’ in the rest of the section,
observed during a one-day period, and sampled every five
minutes. These are shown in Fig. 11a, b, respectively. It was
assumed that Firewall 1 and Firewall 2 represent the BFFD-
DCF service hosted in the public cloud of theLHCCF. In turn,
the real-time statistics of the goodpacket ratiowere generated
separately for Firewall 1 andFirewall 2 using theChi-squared
distribution with an average of 0.7 and 0.3, respectively. The
statistics were generated for a one-day period with particular
points representing samples taken every five minutes. These
are shown in Fig. 11c, d, respectively. A 10Mb/s value of
the throughput of the private cloud was assumed for both
firewalls.
Next, the following simulations were performed for each
firewall. First, the BFFDDCF multiple decision probability
with a value of 1 was assumed, and instantaneous values of
the LHCCF congestion probability and its efficiency were
computed for each sample. Average values of the above
parameters were computed later. These are referred to as ‘ref-
erence values’ in the rest of this section. The same method
was used to calculate average values of the LHCCF con-
gestion probability and its efficiency for 11 values of the
BFFDDCF multiple decision probability, varying from its
minimum value of 0.7 and 0.3, respectively, to its maximum
value of 1. Finally, rates of the average values and reference
values were computed. These are shown in Fig. 11e–h, and
they are referred to as ‘LHCCF congestion probability ratio’
(p′c) and ‘LHCCF efficiency ratio’ (e’), respectively.
It can be seen that the experimental results confirm the
validity of conclusions drawn in Sect. 5: the higher the value
of theBFFDDCFmultiple decision probability, the higher the
LHCCF congestion probability and the lower its efficiency.
There is no easy way of simulating the LHCCF privacy level,
but its relation to the BFFDDCF multiple decision prob-
ability is intuitive: the higher the value of the BFFDDCF
multiple decision probability, the higher the LHCCF privacy
level. Therefore, each of these parameters can be controlled
by selecting an appropriate value of the BFFDDCF multiple
decision probability. Thus, finding a trade-off between them
is possible and is a matter of selecting such a value of the
BFFDDCF multiple decision probability that satisfies busi-
ness requirements. Although there is no single optimal value,
a satisfactory range can be found by knowing basic traffic
statistics of the designed LHCCF and by defining minimum
values of its privacy level and efficiency, and the maximum
value of its congestion probability.
6.2 BF parameters selection
The second part of the experiment aimed to demonstrate that
it is possible to design BFFDDCF with the desired value of
multiple decision probability. Thus, a program which gen-
erates BFFDDCF on the basis of the set of ACL rules and
statistical traffic parameters was implemented and used. This
software is referred to as ‘generator’ in the rest of the article.
Another program which computes the BFFDDCF multiple
decision probability based on the set of ACL rules and sta-
tistical traffic parameters was implemented and used by the
authors too. This second piece of software is referred to as
‘tester’ in the rest of the article. The experiment aimed to
use software to compare two values of BFFDDCF multiple
decision probabilities: one determined by the generator and
the other computed by the tester.
The basic operation of the generator is described below.
First, the generator computes FDD based on a given set
of ACL rules. Then, it determines the value of the BFFD-
DCF multiple decision probability based on given statistical
traffic parameters, including the throughput of the private
cloud, good packet ratio, and rate of traffic at the public
cloud entrance, and analysis performed in Sect. 5.1. Know-
ing the FDD structure and the desired value of the BFFDDCF
multiple decision probability, the generator determines BF
parameters for each of the BFs in BFFDDCF based on analy-
sis performed in Sect. 5.2. Knowing these parameters, it then
transforms FDD to BFFDD by computing the BFs for each
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Fig. 11 Experimental results—BFFDDCFmultiple decision probabil-
ity selection.aFirewall 1—rate of the traffic at the public cloud entrance,
b Firewall 2—rate of the traffic at the public cloud entrance, c Firewall
1—good packet ratio, d Firewall 2—good packet ratio, e Firewall 1—
LHCCF congestion probability ratio, f Firewall 2—LHCCF congestion
probability ratio, g Firewall 1—LHCCF efficiency ratio, h Firewall 2—
LHCCF efficiency ratio
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Table 1 Experimental results
R p (Determined) p (Firewall 1) p (Firewall 2)
0.1SMAX 1 1 1
SMAX 1 1 1
2SMAX 0.444 0.337 0.393
3SMAX 0.259 0.236 0.276
4SMAX 0.167 0.147 0.147
5SMAX 0.111 0.163 0.128
of the FDD edges. Finally, the generator transforms BFFDD
to BFFDDCF by updating the BFs in such way that good
packets always result in multiple decisions.
The multiple decision probability of the BFFDDCF gen-
erated by the generator is later computed by the tester. It does
so by testing each of the packets from a sample in the BFFD-
DCF and checking whether it results in a certain decision
or multiple decisions. Based on the results for all the pack-
ets in the sample, it then computes the BFFDDCF multiple
decision probability.
The experiment was conducted based on security policies
from two different firewalls, the first consisting of a small
number of ACEs and the second consisting of a large num-
ber of ACEs, referred to as ‘Firewall 1’ and ‘Firewall 2’,
respectively. Moreover, a few assumptions regarding statisti-
cal traffic parameters were made. A good packet ratio of 0.1
was assumed in all cases, and six different values of the rate of
traffic at the public cloud entrance were considered. Based
on the above assumptions, the experiment was conducted
on automatically generated samples consisting of 3 932 160
and 62 914 560 network packets, respectively. The results
are given in Table 1. The cells contain both the BFFDDCF
multiple decision probability determined by the generator
and the BFFDDCF multiple decision probability computed
by the tester for each of the two firewalls and for each of the
six values of the rate of traffic at the public cloud entrance.
To better illustrate data from Table 1, these are shown as a
plot in Fig. 12.
Based on the experimental results from Table 1 and Fig.
12, it can be seen that in each case the value of the BFFD-
DCF multiple decision probability computed by the tester
is close to the value of the BFFDDCF multiple decision
probability determined by the generator. Also, in most of
the cases, the value computed by the tester is lower than the
value determined by the generator. A few cases in which
the value computed by the tester is higher than the value
determined by the generator may be the result of a library
used to implement the BF [22], a computational error, or
the internal structure of the security policy. In most cases,
the experimental results coincide with the theoretical values
determined based on Formula 15 and shown in Fig. 9.
Fig. 12 Experimental results—BF parameters selection
All operations were performed on a virtual machine run-
ning the CentOS 6.5 OS with a 2.6GHz processor and 4GB
of Random-Access Memory (RAM). In the course of the
experiment, it turned out that the operation which is the
most computationally expensive in the BFFDDCF genera-
tion process is the operation which transforms the BFFDD
to the BFFDDCF. It was noticed that a relation of the BFFD-
DCF generation time to the number of combinations of good
packets is linear and is around 1s per 100,000. The experi-
ment demonstrated that it is possible to design BFFDDCF in
which its multiple decision probability is as close as possible
to the desired value by selecting appropriate parameters of
the BFs that build it up.
7 Limitations and future work
While it has been shown that the Ladon Hybrid Cloud is an
effective framework for preserving cloud-based firewall pol-
icy confidentiality, it is important to mention its limitations
and suggest directions for future work.
The first is a concern regarding the return traffic. In
Sect. 3, it was stated that the main drawback of the Ladon
framework—the risk of firewall deanonymization by packet
eavesdropping and analysis—can be eliminated by introduc-
ing the purposefulness of packet decision uncertainty in the
public cloud.Although this is true for the forward traffic, such
information can still be gained by packets eavesdropping
and performing analysis of the return traffic. This limitation
applies to the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) only.
This is because the TCP requires all packets to be acknowl-
edged so the packets permitted on the customer side will
result in an acknowledgment in the return traffic. Despite the
fact that this limitation raises a concern, a target solution is
left for future consideration. However, three potential solu-
tions are proposed below.
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The first solution is to route the return traffic via another
link which does not pass through the public cloud on the
CSP side. As a result, the CSP is simply deprived of infor-
mation regarding the return traffic. Another solution is to
encrypt the return traffic. Although the forward traffic needs
to pass unencrypted via the BFFDD on the CSP side, the
return traffic may be encrypted to ensure that no informa-
tion, including acknowledgments, can be retrieved. The third
potential solution is to extend the return traffic with fake
packets including fake acknowledgments. As a result, the
knowledge base regarding the acknowledged packets built
by the hostile CSP becomes inaccurate and expands over
time.
Another limitation is the dependence of the Ladon Hybrid
Cloud on statistical traffic parameters. In Sect. 4, it was men-
tioned that both the rate of traffic at the public cloud entrance
and the good packet ratio values change over time. To address
this, some constant values have been used instead which can
be calculated based on the statistical traffic parameters. How-
ever, assuming that computational power will continue to
increase, it is likely that in the future it will be possible to
adjust the BFFDDCF multiple decision probability contin-
uously based on real-time traffic analysis. This is because
BFFDDCF computation is time-consuming even formodern,
powerful computers. The above may also be a limitation for
organizations which change their firewall policy frequently.
An interesting direction for future development of the
Ladon Hybrid Cloud is analysis of the Ladon Hybrid Cloud
security level in architectures with a federation of multiple
clouds. In this article, just one public and one private cloud
were assumed.However, as cloud federation technologies are
becoming increasingly popular, it is possible to implement
the Ladon Hybrid Cloud in one of the following architec-
tures: many public clouds and one private cloud, one public
cloud and many private clouds, and many public clouds and
many private clouds. With fewer packets flowing between
the public and private clouds, the CSP is able to obtain less
information regarding the original firewall security policy;
therefore, the expected Ladon Hybrid Cloud security level
is higher in architectures with a cloud federation. Detailed
analysis of such frameworks, required in order to demon-
strate the validity of the assumptions, should further be
performed.
8 Conclusions
The number of cloud-based services increases every year.
The maturity of cloud computing technology encourages
organizations to move subsequent types of services, previ-
ously impossible to outsource, into the cloud. This includes
security services which include firewall services. However,
those which have already begun to be widely adopted con-
tinue to suffer from information confidentiality and privacy
issues as a result of firewall policy outsourcing.
While a framework, referred to as Ladon by its authors,
preserving the confidentiality of the original firewall policy
by introducing BFFDD has been proposed, it has a draw-
back: There is a risk of firewall deanonymization by traffic
eavesdropping and analysis. To bypass this issue and limit
the amount of information regarding the original firewall
structure carried in packet headers, a novel framework intro-
ducing the purposefulness of packet decision uncertainty
has been proposed in this article as an extension to Ladon.
This extension known as the Ladon Hybrid Cloud leverages
a hybrid cloud model and performs additional filtering of
packets resulting in multiple decisions after passing through
BFFDD in a private cloud on customer premises. Additional
optimization techniques which help minimize the amount of
information carried by particular packets based on the fire-
wall policy type in use have also been proposed.
As computational resources of the private cloud are usu-
ally limited, an analysis of the Ladon Hybrid Cloud has been
performed to check how the framework deals with this. It has
been shown in the results of the analysis and confirmed in
the results of the experiment that it is possible to control the
rate of traffic at the private cloud entrance by selecting appro-
priate values of BF parameters while knowing basic traffic
statistics. It has also been demonstrated that it is possible
to find a trade-off between the Ladon Hybrid Cloud privacy
level, its congestion probability, and efficiency.
The Ladon Hybrid Cloud allows organizations to take
back control of privacy by helping them preserve their
firewall policy confidentiality when outsourcing firewall
services into the cloud. It extends the regular Ladon frame-
work by eliminating its main drawback—the risk of firewall
deanonymization by packets eavesdropping and analysis.
The Ladon Hybrid Cloud is the final missing part of the
puzzle which resolves the key issue of cloud-based firewall
services: information confidentiality and privacy.
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